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Abstract: Do relative concerns on visible consumption give rise to economic
distortions? We re-examine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta
(2009) building upon their general framework but recognizing that relative
concerns can only apply to visible goods (e.g., cars, clothing, jewelry) and that
households consume both visible and non-visible goods. Contrary to Arrow and
Dasgupta (2009), the answer to this question turns to be always affirmative: the
competitive equilibrium will always be different than the socially optimal one,
since individuals do not take into account the negative externality they exert on
others through the consumption of the visible good, while the social planner
does. If one invokes separability assumptions, then the steady state competitive
equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than the
socially optimal one.
Keywords: visible goods, non-visible goods, conspicuous consumption, conspic-
uous leisure, labor supply, market distortions
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1 Introduction
The thesis that economic agents care not only about their own consumption,
but also about their consumption relative to others can be traced back to
Adam Smith (1776), Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949). Over the last
years economists and sociologists have provided considerable empirical
support for the notion that individuals care about their relative positions in
their communities, often using subjective well-being evidence (Clark and
Oswald 1996; Luttmer 2005; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2007), but also
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linking consumption patterns to relative concerns (Charles, Hurst, and
Roussanov 2009; Kuhn et al. 2011).1
Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009), using US data from the CEX
1985–2002, show that, controlling for differences in permanent income,
Blacks and Hispanics devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles
to visible goods (clothing, jewelry, and cars) than do comparable Whites.2
Kuhn et al. (2011) find substantial social effects of lottery winnings: Dutch
Postcode Lottery nonparticipants who live next door to winners have sig-
nificantly higher levels of car consumption than other nonparticipants.3
Given these empirical findings, one natural question to ask is: Do relative
concerns for visible consumption have negative welfare consequences?, where
visible consumption can be understood as the consumption of goods that are
readily observable in anonymous social interactions and that are portable across
those interactions (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov 2009).4 While the empirical
apparatus is not well suited to answer this question, one can nevertheless, from
a theoretical perspective, analyze the role of relative concerns regarding visible
consumption on the allocation of resources in the economy, a direction followed
for instance by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009).5 Here, we build upon their general
framework but recognizing that not all goods are visible. If relative concerns are
to be relevant, these concerns can only apply to visible goods. This basic insight
1 There is also experimental evidence of social comparison in reward processing centers of the
human brain (Fliessbach et al. 2007).
2 Evidence from the developing world also reveals that poor people tend to spend large
fractions of their budgets on conspicuous items such as phones, funerals and festivals
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007).
3 In addition, they find that visible consumption is declining in reference group income, a
crucial prediction of “demonstration effect” via status-signaling. In the economics literature, a
standard explanation for why households might care about relative consumption of visible
commodities is based on a signaling-by-consuming Veblen’s (1899) explanation: conspicuous
consumption describes the advertisement of one’s income and wealth through lavish spending
on visible commodities. Recently, Moav and Neeman (2012) construct a theoretical model and
show that if human capital is observable and correlated with income, then a signaling equili-
brium in which poor individuals tend to spend a large fraction of their income on conspicuous
consumption can emerge. This would explain why poor educated people can kept locked in
poverty and would be consistent with the expenditure patterns across the developing world.
4 Heffetz (2011) defines socio-cultural visibility of consumer expenditures as the speed with
which members of a society notice a household’s expenditure on different commodities. It is
important to highlight that the physical visibility of consumption is a necessary though not a
sufficient condition for the existence of relative concerns on consumption.
5 Other theoretical contributions on relative concerns include the recent work by Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman (2014), and the references therein.
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proves to have dramatic consequences, leading to crucial differences regarding
our conclusions on the distortional power of relative concerns and those in
Arrow and Dasgupta (2009).
We analyze a competitive economy where individual felicities depend not
only on absolute consumption but also on relative consumption. Crucially,
relevant concerns are only possible if consumption is visible (observable, or
conspicuous in Veblen’s terminology). Precisely, our twist and extension
with respect to Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) is the inclusion of two types of
consumption goods: visible and non-visible. Indeed, not all consumption is
visible. In the US, for example, visible expenditures represent 12% of the
mean quarterly expenditure (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov 2009). In our
model households felicities depend on visible consumption through its absolute
and relative aspects, while depending only on the absolute aspect of non-visible
consumption. Thus, while a household suffers a felicity loss when others’
visible consumption levels rise, because his relative visible consumption
now declines, others’ non-visible consumption is immaterial to household
satisfaction.
We characterize the competitive equilibrium and socially optimal paths, as
well as, the steady state equilibrium, studying the effects of relative concerns of
visible consumption on the mix of personal consumption of visible and non-
visible commodities, leisure and saving in an inter-temporal economy to reex-
amine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009): Do relative concerns
on consumption give rise to economic distortions? Contrary to the finding in
Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), we show that, when households derive utility from
both visible and non-visible consumption goods and visible consumption of
others enters the household utility, the answer to this question turns to be
always affirmative: the competitive equilibrium is distorted. In addition, we
show that the economic distortion must take the form of people consuming
less of the non-visible good, no matter whether labor supply is endogenously
determined and/or leisure is conspicuous, as long as the felicity function is
separable in own consumption of visible and non-visible goods (and in own
consumption of non-visible and others’ consumption of visible goods).
As in Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), we work with a convex technology that
involves a single type of labor and a single reproducible non-deteriorating
capital good that serves also as a consumption (visible or non-visible to others)
good. Proposition 1 establishes that, under relative concerns regarding visible
consumption, as long as the felicity function includes also non-visible consump-
tion, the market equilibrium and the socially optimal paths cannot coincide.
In other words, there is no felicity function satisfying regularity conditions that
avoids market distortions.
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In addition, an important corollary of Proposition 1 allows us to characterize
the steady state competitive equilibrium. We show that, if labor supply is
exogenous, the steady state competitive equilibrium visible consumption is
strictly larger than the socially optimal one, whereas the non-visible consump-
tion is strictly lower than the socially optimal one. In addition, under
separability assumptions, we can characterize the properties of the competitive
equilibrium with endogenous labor supply. If leisure is inconspicuous, we obtain
the same economic distortions characterized by Proposition 2 in Arrow and
Dasgupta (2009) regarding visible consumption, capital and labor supply, plus
an additional new qualitative result: the steady state competitive equilibrium
level of non-visible consumption is lower than the socially optimal one. When
leisure is conspicuous, the only unambiguous economic distortion is that, again,
the steady state competitive equilibrium level of non-visible consumption is
lower than the socially optimal one. These results are consistent with the recent
findings by Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009), who find that higher spend-
ing on conspicuous consumption is at the expense of inconspicuous
consumption.
Our analysis applies to any context where relative concerns are important,
including a world where conspicuous consumption is a signal of unobservable
wealth, but more generally any environment where people feel bad if their
consumption of visible goods is less than that of others. Section 2 contains our
theoretical analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section 3.
2 An Economy with Relative Concerns
The economy consists of two different nonperishable goods: a visible good, ci,
and a non-visible one, xi. Both goods are produced by perfectly competitive
firms and sold to a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households,
which are indexed by i 2 ½0; 1. Time is continuous and each household is
endowed by one unit of total time to be employed in labor activities and leisure.
Let eiðtÞ ð0  eiðtÞ  1Þ and ciðtÞ respectively denote labor supply and visible
consumption rate of each households i at time t, so that
CðtÞ ¼
ð1
0
ciðtÞ di and EðtÞ ¼
ð1
0
eiðtÞ di
represent the average visible consumption of the population, and the aggregate
level of labor in the economy at t, respectively.
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Assumption 1 The household felicity function is given by:
Uðci;C; xiÞ  γVðei; θEÞ ½1
where γ 2 0; 1f g, controls for labor supply to be endogenous ðγ ¼ 1Þ or exogenous
ðγ ¼ 0Þ, and θ 2 0; 1f g controls for leisure to be conspicuous (θ ¼ 1) or incon-
spicuous (θ ¼ 0). In addition, the felicity function of each household satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) Ucðci;C; xiÞ > 0, UCðci;C; xiÞ < 0, Uxðci;C; xiÞ > 0, and Ussðci;C; xiÞ < 0, s ¼
fc; xg
(ii) UcðÞ and UxðÞ are respectively strictly decreasing and strictly increasing
when ci, C and xi move together. Moreover, limci!1 UcðÞ ¼ 0 " ðC; xiÞ, and
limxi!1 UxðÞ ¼ 0 " ðci;CÞ.
(iii) UcðÞ þ UCðÞ > 0 when ci, C and xi move together.
(iv) VeðÞ  0 (with strict inequality when θ ¼ 1), VeeðÞ > 0, and VEðÞ  0
(with equality when θ ¼ 0).
(v) VeðE;EÞ þ VEðE;EÞ > 0 " E.
(vi) VeeðE;EÞ þ VeEðE;EÞ > 0 " E.
(vii) limei!1 Veðei; θEÞ ¼ 0 and limei!0 Veðei; θEÞ ¼ 1, " θ 2 0; 1f g.
The interpretation of Assumption 1 is as follows. The specification of the felicity
function [1] encompasses the cases of exogenous ðγ ¼ 0Þ and endogenous
ðγ ¼ 1Þ labor supply. In this last case, leisure ð1 EÞ can be conspicuous
(θ ¼ 1) or inconspicuous (θ ¼ 0). Condition (i) describes regularity conditions
of the utility function with respect to visible, ci, and non-visible consumption, xi,
and implies that the average visible consumption of the population, C, is
a negative externality for each household i (i.e. UCðci;C; xiÞ < 0). Condition
(iv) implies that the disutility of labor is a strictly convex function of ei, and
that when leisure is conspicuous (θ ¼ 1), the disutility of a given amount of
labor is larger when the average leisure ð1 EÞ in the society increases. This is
the negative externality due to relative concerns regarding leisure. Finally,
conditions (ii)-(iii) and (v)-(vii) guarantee that both the decentralized and the
socially optimal equilibria exist and are unique.
According to eq. [1], household i seeks to maximize the following utility
function at t ¼ 0
Wi ¼
ð1
0
expðδtÞ UðciðtÞ;CðtÞ; xiðtÞÞ  γVðeiðtÞ; θEðtÞÞð Þ dt; δ > 0 ½2
and therefore social welfare at t ¼ 0 can be defined as
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W ¼
ð1
0
ð1
0
expðδtÞ UðciðtÞ;CðtÞ; xiðtÞÞ  γVðeiðtÞ; θEðtÞÞð Þ dt
2
4
3
5di ½3
utility function at t ¼ 0. To close the model, we assume that output at t is
produced by combining capital, KðtÞ, and aggregate labor, EðtÞ with the produc-
tion function FðKðtÞ;EðtÞÞ, where F is concave, increasing and homogenous of
degree 1 in KðtÞ and EðtÞ.
Let us now characterize the market equilibrium and socially optimal
paths.6 Assumption 1 and the concavity of F imply that households behave
identically, so we can focus on the symmetrical equilibrium, that is
ciðtÞ ¼ cðtÞ ¼ CðtÞ, eiðtÞ ¼ eðtÞ ¼ EðtÞ and xiðtÞ ¼ xðtÞ. Then, given that goods
are nonperishable, the accumulation equation for the representative house-
hold can be expressed as
_KðtÞ ¼ FðKðtÞ;EðtÞÞ  cðtÞ  xðtÞ; whereKð0Þ > 0 is given: ½4
Hence, by deriving the first order optimality conditions for households and firms
and imposing market clearing conditions, the decentralized equilibrium is fully
characterized by the following system of equations
UcðCmðtÞ;CmðtÞ; xmðtÞÞ ¼ pmðtÞ ½5
UxðCmðtÞ;CmðtÞ; xmðtÞÞ ¼ pmðtÞ ½6
γVeðEmðtÞ; θEmðtÞÞ ¼ pmðtÞFEðKmðtÞ;EmðtÞÞ ½7
_pmðtÞ
pmðtÞ ¼ δ FK ½8
where the superscriptm denotes market equilibrium and pmðtÞ is the costate variable
for the constraint [4]. As for the socially optimal path, this is characterized by
UcðCoðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ þ UCðCoðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ ¼ poðtÞ ½9
UxðCoðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ ¼ poðtÞ ½10
γ VeðEoðtÞ; θEoðtÞÞ þ θVEðEoðtÞ; θEoðtÞÞ½  ¼ poðtÞFEðKoðtÞ; EoðtÞÞ ½11
6 As in Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), we do not study the existence of either equilibrium or
optimal paths because the relevant theorems in Stokey and Lucas (1989) can be used to show
that they do exist under the conditions we have placed on preferences and technology.
6 C. Quintana-Domeque and F. Turino
Brought to you by | Universidad de Alicante
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/30/15 8:21 AM
_poðtÞ
poðtÞ ¼ δ FK ½12
together with the capital law of motion [4].7 The effects of relative concerns on
visible consumption can be derived by comparing the equilibrium conditions in
the decentralized economy with the socially optimal plan. The results of this
comparison, as well as the characterization of the steady state equilibrium, are
presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that the felicity function of the representative household
satisfies Assumption 1. Then the socially optimal and market equilibrium paths
cannot coincide.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In addition, an important corollary of this proposition allows us to char-
acterize the economic distortions of the steady state competitive equilibrium.
Corollary 1 If labor supply is exogenous ðγ ¼ 0Þ, Cm > Co and xm < xo. In
addition, if the felicity function is separable in ci and xi (Ucx ¼ 0) and separable in
xi and C (UxC ¼ 0), then the steady state equilibrium with endogenous labor supply
ðγ ¼ 1Þ is characterized by the following economic distortions:
(i) if leisure is inconspicuous (θ ¼ 0), Cm>Co; xm<xo; Em> Eo andKm>Ko
(ii) if leisure is conspicuous (θ ¼ 1), xm< xo .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In contrast with the results of Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) (Propositions 1
and 3), Proposition 1 establishes that, when we allow for the presence of both
visible and non-visible consumption goods, and visible consumption is subject
to relative concerns, there is no felicity function satisfying regularity conditions
that avoids market distortions. This result holds independently of whether labor
supply is a choice variable or not, or whether leisure is conspicuous or not. What
is the intuition of this result? When the consumer chooses over a bundle of
goods but only a subset of them is subject to relative concerns, for the decen-
tralized equilibrium to be Pareto optimal, the marginal utility of each good not
subject to relative concerns needs to be the same across the market and socially
optimal paths. This requirement implies that also the shadow prices have to be
the same across the two equilibria, a condition that commands equality between
the marginal utilities of externality-producing goods. For this last requirement to
7 When γ ¼ 0, then EðtÞ ¼ 1 and FE ¼ 0, so that eqs [7] and [11] are trivially satisfied.
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be true, however, households should behave exactly as the social planner, so
that they internalize the effects of the externalities when choosing their con-
sumption bundles. Thus, there is no felicity function that can avoid market
distortions. Moreover, as summarized in Corollary 1, as long as separability
assumptions hold, such economic distortions are the same as that of
Proposition 2 of Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) regarding visible consumption,
labor supply and saving. However, adding non-visible consumption allows us
to highlight a new economic distortion: the steady state competitive equilibrium
non-visible consumption is strictly lower than the socially optimal one.
3 Conclusion
Our article relies on a very simple idea: If relative concerns are to be relevant, which
is consistent with a bulk of empirical studies, these concerns can only apply to
visible goods (i.e., goods that are readily observable in anonymous social interac-
tions and portable across those interactions). If households consume both visible
and non-visible goods, and the former are subject to relative concerns, then it must
be the case that the competitive equilibrium is distorted: the competitive equili-
brium marginal rate of substitution between the visible and non-visible goods will
always be different than the socially optimal one, since individuals do not take into
account the negative externality they exert on others through the consumption of
the visible good, while the social planner does.
In general, it is not possible to provide an unambiguous characterization of
the levels of consumption (and other economic variables) in the steady state
competitive equilibrium with respect to their socially optimal levels. Still, if one
imposes separability assumptions in the utility function, the steady state com-
petitive equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than
the socially optimal one. These assumptions do not appear to be ill-suited, at
least given the empirical evidence showing that higher spending on conspicuous
consumption is at the expense of inconspicuous consumption, both in devel-
oped and in developing countries.
We concludewith an important remark. The existence result of a utility function
satisfying regularity conditions such that the competitive equilibrium is socially
optimal in Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) requires that all goods are visible, so that all
goods are subject to relative concerns. This is, of course, a very strong assumption.
Once we relax it, we are back to a world where relative concerns on visible
consumption are a source of economic distortions. Given that more visible goods
tend to be more positional (Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman 2005;
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Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, andMartinsson 2007; Solnick andHemenway 2005),
extending our model to incorporate different degrees of positionality8 for different
goods (including leisure) could be a fruitful avenue for future research. This would
allow to quantify thewelfare losses due to economic distortions arising from relative
concerns.
Funding: Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
(ECO2011-29751 and ECO2012-36719) is gratefully acknowledged.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Assume that CmðtÞ ¼ CoðtÞ and xmðtÞ ¼ xoðtÞ. Then eqs [6] and [10] imply
poðtÞ=pmðtÞ ¼ 1. Given eqs [5] and [9], it follows that
1 ¼ UcðC
oðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ þ UCðCoðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ
UcðCmðtÞ;CmðtÞ; xmðtÞÞ : ½13
This requires UCðCoðtÞ;CoðtÞ; xoðtÞÞ ¼ 0, which is a contradiction given
Assumption 1. Hence, the socially optimal and the market equilibrium paths
cannot coincide.
Proof of corollary 1
Suppose that labor supply is exogenous ðγ ¼ 0Þ. Given eqs [8] and [12], at
the steady state Km ¼ Ko ¼ K. Now, assume that Cm  Co . The resources
constraint FðKÞ ¼ Cs þ xs; s ¼ fo;mg, implies xm  xo . In addition, from
eqs [5]–[6] and [9]–[10] it follows that UcðCm;Cm; xm Þ ¼ UxðCm;Cm; xm Þ and
UcðCo;Co; xo Þ þ UCðCo;Co; xo Þ ¼ UxðCo;Co; xo Þ. Combining these two equa-
tions and using the resources constraint
UcðCm;Cm;FðKÞ  Cm Þ  UcðCo;Co; FðKÞ  Co Þ
  UCðCo;Co; FðKÞ  Co Þ ¼
UxðCm;Cm; FðKÞ  Cm Þ  UxðCo;Co; FðKÞ  Co Þ
8 The marginal degree of positionality measures the fraction of the total utility change which
comes from increased relative consumption from the last dollar spent (see Alpizar, Carlsson,
and Johansson-Stenman 2005).
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However, given Assumption 1, the right-hand side (RHS) and the left-hand side
(LHS) of the previous expression have different signs: the LHS is strictly positive
and the RHS is non-positive. This contradicts Cm
  Co . Therefore, Cm > Co
and xm < xo.
Suppose now that labor supply is endogenous ðγ ¼ 1Þ, that the utility function
is separable in ci and xi, and in xi and C (i.e. Ucx ¼ UxC ¼ 0), and that leisure is
inconspicuous (θ ¼ 0). Let f ðkÞ denote the production function in intensive form,
where k¼ K=E. Given the assumptions on F, f is an increasing and concave function
of k, with f ð0Þ ¼ 0. In addition, FKðK;EÞ ¼ f 0 ðkÞ and FEðK;EÞ ¼ f ðkÞ  kf 0 ðkÞ. From
eqs [8] and [12], it follows that ko
 ¼ km ¼ k. Moreover, the resources constraint can
be written as Es

f ðkÞ ¼ Cs þ xs with s ¼ fm; og. Let us define dS ¼ Sm  So as
the change in the variable S between the two equilibria. We first consider the case
with dE ¼ Em  Eo ¼ 0. Given eqs [7] and [11] and given that ko ¼ km , the costate
variable must be the same in both equilibria. This contradicts Proposition 1.
Therefore, we must have dE  0. Consider now the case with dE < 0. Since
VðE;0Þ is a strictly convex function of E, this implies VeðEm ;0Þ < VeðEo ;0Þ.
Therefore Pm

< Po

. Given the first order conditions [5]–[12], this requires that the
consumption allocations pairs ðCm ; xm Þ and ðCo ; xo Þ satisfy
UcðCm;Cm; xm Þ  UcðCo;Co; xo Þ < UCðCo;Co; xo Þ ½14
UxðCm;Cm; xm Þ < UxðCo;Co; xo Þ ½15
To verify the aforementioned conditions, we proceed by totally differentiating
Uc, Ux and the resources constraint. In doing so, we make use of the separability
assumptions. Hence,
dUc ¼ ðUcc þ UcCÞdC ½16
dUx ¼ Uxxdx ½17
dEf ðkÞ ¼ dC þ dx ½18
Given eq. [18], dE ¼Em– Eo < 0 requires that dC and dx cannot be both non-
negative at the same time. Moreover, in order to satisfy conditions [14] and [15],
we must have dUx < 0 and dUc < 0. Because of item (ii) in Assumption 1 and
Ucx ¼ 0, ðUcc þ UcCÞ < 0 which implies dC > 0 by eq. [16]. In addition, because of
item (i) in Assumption 1, Uxx < 0 which implies dx > 0 by eq. [17]. But this is a
contradiction, since dx and dC cannot be both non-negative at the same time.
Finally, let us consider the case when dE ¼ Em–Eo > 0. From the first order
conditions, this requires
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UcðCm;Cm; xm Þ  UcðCo;Co; xo Þ > UCðCo;Co; xo Þ ½19
UxðCm;Cm; xm Þ > UxðCo;Co; xo Þ ½20
Now, in order to satisfy condition [20], in equilibrium we must have dUx > 0.
Hence, given that Uxx < 0, eq. [17] implies dx < 0. Moreover, given eq. [18],
assuming dE > 0 requires that dC and dx cannot be both non-positive at the
same time. Therefore, dC > 0, which implies dUc < 0, and this is compatible with
eq. [19]. Therefore, at the steady state Em

> Eo

, Cm

> Co

, xm

< xo

, and, since
km ¼ k0, Km > Ko .
Suppose now that θ ¼ 1, so that leisure is conspicuous. In this case, the total
differentials of Uc, Ux, Ve and the resources constraint are given by eqs [16]–[18]
and in addition
dVe ¼ ðVee þ VeEÞdE ½21
Suppose that dE ¼ 0. From eq. [21], dVe ¼ 0, and from eq. [18], dC ¼ –dx. Hence,
we can distinguish three cases: (i) dC > 0 and dx < 0, (ii) dC < 0 and dx > 0, and
(iii) dC ¼ dx ¼ 0. Let us start with (i). From eq. [16], dUc < 0. From eq. [17],
dUx > 0, which implies Pm

> Pm
o
, because of eqs [6] and [10]. In addition, from
conditions [5] and [9] and conditions [7] and [11], Pm

> Pm
o
requires that
UcðCm;Cm; xm Þ  UcðCo;Co; xo Þ > UCðCo;Co; xo Þ ½22
VeðEm;Em Þ  VeðEo;Eo Þ > VEðEo;Eo Þ ½23
whichare compatiblewithdUc <0anddVe¼0. Consider now (ii):dC < 0anddx > 0.
From eq. [16], dUc > 0. From eq. [17], dUx < 0, which implies Pm

< Pm
o
, because of
eqs [6] and [10]. But then, from conditions [5] and [9], Pm

< Pm
o
requires that
UcðCm;Cm; xm Þ  UcðCo;Co; xo Þ < UCðCo;Co; xo Þ ½24
which is a contradiction, since the LHS of eq. [24] is strictly positive (dUc > 0) and
its RHS is strictly negative (UC < 0). Finally, consider case (iii). dE ¼ dC ¼ dx ¼ 0
contradicts Proposition 1, and therefore cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, we
conclude that if dE ¼ 0, then xm < xo .
Suppose now that dE > 0. From eq. [21], dVe > 0, and from eq. [18], dC and
dx cannot be both negative at the same time. Again, we can distinguish three
cases: (i) dC > 0 and dx  0, (ii) dC > 0 and dx < 0, and (iii) dC  0 and dx > 0.
Let us start with (i). From eq. [17], dUx  0, which implies Pm  Pmo , because of
eqs [6] and [10]. But then, from conditions [7] and [11], this requires that
VeðEm ;Em Þ  VeðEo ;Eo Þ  VEðEo ;Eo Þ ½25
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which is a contradiction, since the LHS of eq. [25] is strictly positive (dVe > 0) and
its RHS is strictly negative (VE < 0). Consider now (ii): dC > 0 and dx < 0. From
eq. (16), dUc < 0. From eq. [17], dUx > 0, which implies Pm

> Pm
o
, because of eqs
[6] and [10]. In addition, from conditions [5] and [9] and conditions [7] and [11],
Pm

> Pm
o
requires conditions [22] and [23] which are compatible with dUc < 0 and
dVe > 0. As for the case (iii), dC  0 and dx > 0, from eq. [17], dUx < 0, which
implies Pm

< Pm
o
, because of eqs [6] and [10]. But then, from conditions [7]
and [11], this requires that eq. [25] is satisfied with strict inequality which is again
a contradiction, since dVe > 0 and VE < 0. Hence, we conclude that if dE > 0, then
xm

< xo

. Finally, suppose that dE < 0. From eq. [21], dVe < 0, and from eq. [18],
dC and dx cannot be both positive at the same time. Hence, we can distinguish
three cases: (i) dC  0 and dx < 0, (ii) dC < 0 and dx < 0, and (iii) dC < 0 and
dx  0. Following the same strategy as in the previous two cases, it is easy to
show that in equilibrium, if dE < 0, then xm

< xo

. Thus, in all of the feasible
cases, xm < xo. This proves the statement.
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